The recent Eurozone debt crisis has witnessed sharp decouplings in cross-country bond yields without commensurate shifts in relative fundamentals. We rationalize this phenomenon in a model wherein countries with different fundamentals are on different equilibrium paths all along, but which become discernible only during bad times. Key ingredients are cross-country differences in the volatility and persistence of fiscal revenue shocks combined with their unobservability by investors. Differences in the cyclicality of fiscal revenues affect the option value of borrowing and resulting default risk; unobservability of fiscal shocks makes bond pricing responsive to market actions. When tax revenues are hit by common positive shocks, no country increases net debt and interest spreads stay put. When a common negative revenue shock hits and is persistent, low volatility countries with higher default costs adjust spending while others resort to borrowing. This difference signals a relative deterioration of fiscal outlooks, interest spreads jump and decoupling takes place.
Introduction
From the times of Alexander Hamilton to Mario Draghi, debt crises have repeatedly dragged policy makers into taking a stand on a polemic question-namely, what triggers sudden decouplings of bond yields across national or sub-national borders following protracted spells of yield convergence? Such a reversal of fortunes has been at play in the Eurozone until very recently. As illustrated in Figure 1 , from the eve of the monetary union in end-1998 to the onset of the global financial crisis ten years on, yield convergence was remarkable; this was so in terms of both magnitude and length, as well as in its defiance of widely known differences in institutions, fiscal performances, and productivity differentials across Eurozone states. No less dramatic has been its post-2008 reversal: yield decoupling reached unprecedented heights, with the cross-country dispersion of bond yields surpassing even those during the severe market turbulences of the 1990s. These developments are all the more disconcerting since at the epicenter of the crisis lie countries not so long ago heralded as growth success stories of the advanced world, such as Ireland and Spain, as well as countries like Greece and Portugal which have been long declared as graduated from "debt intolerance" (Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano 2003) .
The goal of our paper is to propose a theoretical mechanism -among possible othersthat can rationalize this sudden yield coupling and decoupling without a commensurate changes in relative country fundamentals.
Our model builds on the finite horizon textbook model of sovereign borrowing and default (see, e.g, Obsfeld and Rogoff, 1996 and Feenstra and Taylor, 2011) . In that model, as well as ours, borrowing buys the option of defaulting, and the value of that option rises on the volatility of the income shock. Optimal borrowing is defined by a trade-off between the default option value benefit and the rising interest cost associated with extra borrowing.
We extend this setting in three directions, taking into account key ingredients highlighted in many accounts of the recent Euro crisis. First, by introducing an intermediate period in which the economy experiences a persistent shock and investors can re-price risk amidst continuous borrowing. Second, we relax the full information assumption; direct observation of fiscal shock realizations is a preserve of the sovereign borrower but not of the mass of lenders. This extension adds another cost of issuing, absent in the symmetric information benchmark: a signaling cost. This assumption gains extra realism in the context of our third model extension -namely, the relevant fiscal shock is to government's tax revenues.
In our three-period model a country issues long-term (two-period) debt to finance investment that, upon maturity, is expected to yield sizable revenue gains. Fiscal revenues follow a stochastic path with realizations at the intermediate and final periods, which may cause tax revenue collection to fall short of planned spending. In response to the persistent middle period shock, the country can either adjust spending, and refrain from borrowing, or it can tap capital markets to finance the emerging fiscal gap. The middle shock realization is directly observable by the sovereign but not by international lenders: the latter can only infer the fiscal path by observing the sovereign's actions, which can either be borrowing or non-borrowing in the middle period. In the final period, the country decides whether to repay or default. If it defaults, it faces some loss of income/fiscal revenues and lenders can recover potentially some (but not the full) face value of debt obligations. In this setting we model the interaction between the country and lenders as a game and solve for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE). We solve our model numerically and show that two types of equilibrium can exist: a separating equilibrium, in which the country only issues new debt after a bad shock realization, and a pooling equilibrium, in which the country never chooses to issue new debt in the intermediate period (regardless of the shock realization). This stands in sharp contrast with the symmetric information case, in which a country always find optimal to issue in the intermediate period. Under the same plausible parametrization for the size and persistence of the tax revenue shock, the extra signaling costs due to asymmetric information make non-issuance optimal for countries with high enough default costs. Moreover, this new trade-off between default option benefits vs. the signaling costs is what will determine whether a country is in a separating or a pooling equilibrium.
How can this framework help explain the pattern of country spreads illustrated in Figure   1 ? Consider two countries, one at each end of the yield dispersion spectrum. Suppose that Country-A, characterized by a set of weaker fundamentals (implying low default costs), sustains a separating equilibrium in which it stays put after a good fiscal shock and issues new debt after a bad fiscal shock. Conversely, suppose that Country-B is characterized by a set of stronger fundamentals (implying higher default costs) and sustains a pooling equilibrium in which it never taps the market regardless of the fiscal realization. When the two countries are hit by a positive fiscal shock, investors observe both countries refraining from borrowing and this generates only a small spread between country yields. The gap in country spreads that should prevail due to the gap in country fundamentals is dampened by the presence of informational noise. The situation is quite different following a large negative shock. In this case, the informational noise will amplify the effects on spreads of whatever differences in fundamentals were present prior to the shock: investors learn that country-A is on a negative fiscal path relative to country-B, so the interest spread between the two countries widens. Hence, our model provides a possible mechanism that can rationalize the 2000-2007 period of yield compression -when shocks to aggregate income and country-specific tax bases were either positive or only mildly negative across the Eurozone (as we document in Section 2), and the posterior yield decoupling-when those same shocks were highly negative. In short, fiscal "discoveries" can thus explain both yield convergence and sudden yield decoupling. Importantly, such decoupling does not arise in the symmetric information version of our model in which countries always issue and experience a significant upwards re-pricing following a bad shock.
Two observations are important at this point. First, in our model each country is defined by a perfectly observed set of fundamentals that are public-knowledge. Hence, investors are not uncertain about whether a country is a "bad" or a "good" type: investors know that country A's fundamentals are weaker than country B's. What they do not observe is countries' A and B fiscal shock realizations. This distinction is important to the extent that it would be very difficult to defend an assumption of asymmetric information regarding countries' types concerning fundamentals that are readily apparent. Our model assumes that all macroeconomic fundamentals are perfectly observable. The assumption on informational asymmetry is subtler: it relates to the real time fiscal shock realizations. This is an easier assumption to defend and in Section 2 we provide a discussion as to why this is arguably realistic in the Eurozone context. In sum, it is the interaction between differences in known fundamentals (which pin-down the country's dominant strategy) and unknown shocks realizations that allow spreads to converge or diverge widely.
Second, the theoretical mechanism just described does not rationalize convergence and sudden yield decoupling by a general cross-country shift from a pooling to a separating equilibrium. Instead, convergence and divergence obtain once a common shock hits countries that are already on different equilibrium paths-some on a separating and some on a pooling equilibrium path. Whether a country finds optimal to play a pooling or a separating strategy depends on the trade-off between the option value of borrowing vs. the signaling costs and the high debt servicing cost in case the default option is not exercised.
This trade-off depends on a variety of fundamental parameters such as the country's discount factor, initial debt levels, the fiscal loss and hair-cut parameters that pin down the relative cost of default, and the underlying shock volatility and persistence.
Numerical solutions of our model yield the following results. First, countries with weaker fundamentals generally find it optimal to play a separating strategy, whereas those with stronger fundamentals opt for pooling. In particular, a separating equilibrium is more prevalent in countries for which default costs are lower. Second, higher short-run volatility relative to long-run volatility increases the dominance of separating equilibrium and raises spreads. Third, the persistence of revenue shocks has a quantitatively important effect on interest spreads. If the equilibrium is separating and the (AR1) persistence of its tax revenue shocks is raised by 0.2 (a typical difference in fiscal revenue persistence across Eurozone countries, as we document below), spreads can rise by more than 400 basis points. Interestingly, we find broad regions of parameter values (which are empirically relevant) on which equilibrium abruptly changes from pooling to separating. Hence, the resulting equilibria turn out to be quite sensitive to small perturbations in parameter values. Finally, our simulations also show that default is more likely in a separating equilibrium, despite being also plausible in a pooling equilibrium.
This paper relates to a large literature on sovereign borrowing and default risk, starting with Eaton and Gersovitz's (1981) seminal contribution. As in the subsequent models such as Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) , Arellano (2008) , our model builds on the volatility and persistence of output shocks (tax revenue shocks in our setting) as drivers of country risk. Asymmetric information in our model (absent in these previous papers) transforms market actions into signals with tangible implications for bond pricing. In papers like Arellano (2008) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) , the debt-output state space exhibits a sharp boundary, the so-called default frontier -between regions of certain non-default and certain default. This feature opens the possibility of highly non-linear yield behavior as a very small increase in debt levels generates a dramatic increase in spread . This type of non-linearity in yield behavior featured in this class of models is highly knife-edged: the economy typically needs to be in a very narrow debt range so that an output shock of the range observed before debt crises can generate a large non-linear effect on spreads.
Outside this narrow range close to the default frontier, spreads vary very little, and the volatility of bond prices is counterfactually lower than the volatility of debt quantities. By contrast, under our asymmetric information mechanism, the results do not depend at all on being in some specific debt region to start with. To sharpen this point, we assume that all countries have the same initial debt level and are not knife-edged since there is a large range of fundamentals and a large range of shock process parameters that can sustain a non-linear yield behavior.
In contrast to a vast prior literature, from Cole and Kehoe (2000) to Broner et al. (2013) , the spike in sovereign spreads in our result do not result a self-fulfilling debt spiral, but reflects that countries with different fundamentals follow similar debt accumulation strategies in good times but different ones in bad times, leading to a sudden and potentially sharp re-pricing of default risk.The amplification mechanism comes from the existence all along of two different equilibria (pooling vs.separating) whose effect become apparent in bad times, not from a shift from a good to a bad equilibrium. We see the Broner et al.(2013) explanation of the Eurozone crisis, based on a combination of credit discrimination and a crowding out effect of public debt on private investment leading to a self-fulfilling crisis, as complementary to ours. While our model provides a rationale for the sharp divergence in Eurozone sovereign bond spread in the aftermath of the crisis, it does not address the issue of sovereign default contagion. Jeanne and Bolton (2011) demonstrate how financial integration among countries can amplify such contagion in the context of a financially, but not fiscally, integrated union.
In featuring asymmetric information and signaling through market tapping, our setting relates to Eaton (1996) , Alfaro and Kanuzck (2005) , Sandleris (2008) , Catão, Fostel, and Kapur (2009), and D'Erasmo (2011) who also study how investors' uncertainty about the country's type determine fluctuations in sovereign spreads. A key difference is that in our paper investors are not uncertain about whether a country is a bad or a good type, as each country is defined by a perfectly observed set of fundamentals. Investors know that country A's fundamentals are weaker than country B's, but what they do not observe countries' fiscal shock realization. In highlighting the role of market tapping as a signal of fiscal prospects, our paper is also related to an earlier literature on the timing of fiscal consolidations as Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Drudi and Prati (2000) . But once again the uncertainty in these papers is about the type of government in charge not on the fiscal revenue realizations as in our paper.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical anal- 
Stylized Facts of the Eurozone Debt Crisis
This section documents the key empirical regularities that motivate our analysis. While the bond pricing dynamics that our model seeks to explain is arguably also relevant to other past debt crises, we limit the scope of our exercise to the Eurozone crisis developments since 2007.
The shock that set in motion the macroeconomic dynamics at stake was the string of defaults in sub-prime mortgage market in the United States from mid-2007, which eventually turned into a full-blown financial crisis upon the collapse of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008. To the Eurozone, this constituted its first large common shock rippling through all member countries since the introduction of the common currency in 1999. 1 As illustrated in Figure 2 , growth turned sharply negative in both the Eurozone core and periphery countries. Moreover, as shown in Figure 3 , consumer price inflation subsided, exacerbating the decline in nominal GDP and government revenues.
Despite the remarkable convergence in sovereign yields (see Figure 1) , there are considerable cross-country differences in starting positions regarding key macroeconomic fundamentals.
First, as Table 1 shows, notwithstanding the lower per-capita incomes in the periphery, all four crisis-countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) 2 displayed negative growth in total factor productivity (TFP) through 2007, while all other countries (with the exception of Italy) exhibited positive TFP growth. 3 Second, as fleshed out in the second column (last two rows) of Table 2 , crisis-countries were on average considerably more closed to foreign trade, as gauged by the ratio of exports to GDP. To the extent that the cost of default rises on trade openness (see Rose, 2006 , for empirical evidence), these differences in openness also marshaled against yield convergence. Finally, and central to the model environment presented in the next section, structural fiscal positions (i.e. cyclically-adjusted underlying fiscal positions) also differed significantly: the crisis-countries posted structural deficits on average and had a record of far more unstable (inflation-adjusted) tax revenues. While these differences in underlying fundamentals between the euro area "periphery" and "core" were substantial, headline indicators -notably concerning fiscal positions -tended to mask these differences, painting a picture more consistent with the observed convergence in bond yields. As shown in the half-right of Table 2 , the median headline fiscal balance was -1.1% of GDP for the crisis-countries and -1.5% for the core. Due to the combination of yield convergence and higher GDP growth in the periphery (see Figure 2 ), interest payments on public debt were also remarkably similar as a share of GDP (-2.7%) and public debt to GDP ratios were in fact a bit lower (though differences become more trivial once one excludes Italy from the non-crisis group).
This would change from the first half of 2008. While general government deficits emerged in all countries, as shown in Figure 4 , they spiked up in the "periphery" despite -once again -the growth shock being roughly common to all. Figures 5 and 6 show that such a sharp increase in fiscal deficits was not only due to collapsing fiscal revenues (particularly in Ireland and Spain due to the well-known collapse of over-heated property markets), but also to uncurbed growth of primary (i.e. non-interest) spending in the periphery, which kept expanding at its pre-crisis pace or even faster. In contrast, public spending behavior in the core countries adjusted more promptly to the negative revenue shock. The flip side of 2 We define as crisis countries the countries in our sample who received financial assistance from the European Union ( http://ec.europa.eu/economy finance/assistance eu ms/spain/index en.htm).
3 In computing these averages, one might ask whether including Italy as part of the non-crisis countries set is warranted, given that many of its fundamentals resemble more closely those of other euro area peripheral countries. However, using medians as the central tendency metric allays some of those concerns. In any event' our inferences are robust to eliminating Italy from the non-crisis sample.
this differential fiscal behavior is that peripheral countries started tapping capital markets extensively from early 2009. 4 As tapping continued and GDP continue to fall in 2009 and 2010, the ratio of public debt to GDP soared ( Figure 7 ) and so did the decoupling of bond yields viz. the Eurozone core (cf. Figure 1 ).
As yields shot up, the interest bills of the peripheral governments started jumping up too. As shown in Figure 8 , interest spending as a share of GDP started rising in all four peripheral countries from 2009 and all the more so in countries where bond yields rose faster (notably Greece); in remarkable contrast, interest spending in the core Eurozone declined.
As yield decoupling continues through the first half of 2012, its instructive to revisit the relationship between relative yields and relative fundamentals at that juncture. Table 2 provides some insight, replicating all the entries in the preceding Table 1. The comparison shows that differences in underlying fundamentals changed little between pre-crisis and the crisis peak (i.e. the maximal point of yield decoupling in 2012): underlying fundamentals in core countries continued to be generally stronger than those of the four periphery countries.
If anything, the gap narrowed viz. the periphery, as crisis adjustment measures begin to kick. Yet, the response of bond yield looked completely insensitive to this gap or (if anything) to any improvement in underlying fundamentals in the periphery. Once again, looking at the right-half of Table 2 , what seems to underpin the behavior of yields was the increased market tapping and the new upward trajectory of debt to GDP in peripheral countries after 2007; as just seen, this was exacerbated by the endogenous rise in interest payments on public debt as fresh issuance continued.
The final element that appeared to have added non-trivial amplification to the original shock and rising public debt was the widening dispersion of public debt forecasts for the periphery viz. the core. As shown in Figure 9 , revisions in projected debt to GDP ratios were especially dramatic for the four peripheral countries and included upward revisions to current and past debt too (depicted in Figure 9 as successive upticks in the initial debt 4 According to data from Dealogic, the combined public and private sectors in Greece issued $70. . While new issuance did fall sharply in 2011 for the first three countries, it still remained non-trivial; and in the case of Spain, it actually rose to all time high of $192 trillion in 2011. From 2010 on, heavier borrowing in private capital markets was complemented by access to lending facilities from the European central bank and growing imbalances in the target-2 system of payment settlement which brought greater awareness by investors on the size of intra-eurozone fiscal imbalances (see Sinn, 2011) . Such a combination of frantic market tapping despite rising spreads and the realization that official lending turned out to be much larger than planned (and unable to mitigate indefinitely true default risk if debt keeps snowballing) appear to signal a greater likelihood that the periphery's fiscal path was unsustainable without substantial debt write-offs.
to GDP ratio in 2008 in future forecast vintages). Unsurprisingly, this raised questions on data reliability and the extent of official disclosure on true state of those countries' fiscal accounts. Such suspicions are generally not unfounded because, unlike the greater public, incumbent governments have direct observation of tax returns and likely greater awareness of political pressures pro and against spending adjustment; so the incentives to smooth the disclosure of fiscal news rises in bad times and specially so in a currency union where penalties for fiscal deviations need to stricter. 5 Attendant uncertainty on the true state of public finances and hence on fiscal outlooks adds yet another amplification layer by potentially inducing investors to attach greater weight to "actions" -in this case the steeping up of government borrowing. As our model will show, bond yields can then adjust more aggressively to the newly perceived outlook than what is warranted by both headline fiscal figures and changes in underlying country fundamentals. In what follows, we explore the theoretical mechanisms that are consistent with this narrative, wherein a large negative shock to fiscal revenues turns into a "wake-up call" to bond markets, capable generating a dramatic decoupling of bond yields after a period of remarkable convergence.
A Fiscal Model of Sovereign Debt
This section presents the environment that describes our economy. We use a gametheoretical approach to model the interaction of the sovereign borrower and lenders. We do so for the cases of symmetric vs. asymmetric information on fiscal shocks and show how asymmetric information, coupled with the persistence of the shock, can be critical in determining the nature (pooling vs. separating) and type of equilibria (default vs. nondefault) in this model economy. As we shall see in the numerical simulations presented in 5 One telling illustration of such concerns is provided in an official report by the European commission on the state of Greek government debt and deficit statistics dated of January 2010, thus at a crucial turning point of the crisis. It states: "On 2 and 21 October 2009, the Greek authorities transmitted two different sets of complete Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) notification tables to Eurostat, covering the government deficit and debt data for [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , and a forecast for 2009. In the 21 October notification, the Greek government deficit for 2008 was revised from 5.0% of GDP (the ratio reported by Greece, and published and validated by Eurostat in April 2009) to 7.7% of GDP. At the same time, the Greek authorities also revised the planned deficit ratio for 2009 from 3.7% of GDP (the figure reported in spring) to 12.5% of GDP, reflecting a number of factors (the impact of the economic crisis, budgetary slippages in an electoral year and accounting decisions). According to the appropriate regulations and practices, this report deals with estimates of past data only." Similar, albeit less extreme commentary, is found in the contemporary press about the state of public finances of other southern governments, including by newly elected officials claiming that the true state of fiscal accounts was not fully disclosed by previous incumbents. For instance, on 31 January 2011, the Financial Times reported that: "Catalonia, one of the richest parts of Spain, needs to raise €10bn-€11bn in debt this year to cover deficits and repay earlier loans. . . Andreu Mas-Colell, finance minister in the newly elected Catalan nationalist government, conceded in an interview with the Financial Times that it was "not a negligible amount", as he added up the numbers and explained how he had inherited unfunded deficits from the previous, Socialist-led regional government. 'We're not yet guilty of anything,' he said, in an echo of the outraged complaints of Greek ministers in 2009 when they inherited a deficit from their predecessors in power that was much worse than previously announced."
Sections 4 and 5, using simple functional forms for preferences, shocks and default costs is sufficient to generate a rich array of equilibria involving issuance and non-issuance in the middle period and default vs. non-default in the final period can materialize and lead to distinct paths for bond yields
Fiscal Revenue Shocks and Sovereign Debt
The economy has three periods, t = 0, 1, and 2. A government issues bonds in international capital markets to finance long-term investment which can be related to physical infrastructure and/or human capital development. The investment undertaken in period 0, τ 0 , generates expected fiscal revenues τ 1 and τ 2 in periods 1 and 2 respectively.
In period 1 the government's fiscal revenue is given by F 1 = τ 1 +˜ 1 , where˜ 1 is a shock that assumes two values: H 1 = ατ 1 and L 1 = −ατ 1 , with probability p and 1 − p respectively, and α < 1. A key assumption throughout is that the shock is persistent, so that ρ 1 still affects fiscal revenues in period 2, where 0 < ρ < 1 is the persistence parameter.
In period 2 the government's fiscal revenue is given by F 2 = τ 2 + ρ 1 +˜ 2 , where the new shock˜ 2 can assume two values, H 2 or L 2 with probability q and 1 − q respectively.
The government has access to debt markets in periods 0 and 1. In order to finance the initial investment requirement at time 0, the sovereign issues long-term debt to be paid in period 2. It issues D 0 = τ 0 at time t = 0, it pays interest r 0 τ 0 at t = 1 and it promises to pay (1 + r 0 )τ 0 at maturity at t = 2.
At period 1, upon receiving the fiscal shock˜ 1 , the borrower has two possible strategies, s 1 = N, I as follows:
In this case, the borrower does not issue new debt and just pays interest due at time 1. Hence, the total outstanding debt at the end of the middle period is τ 0 .
"Fresh Issuance" (s 1 = I).
In this case the borrower issues fresh one-period debt. It issues D 1 = ατ 1 , and promises to pay (1 + r 1 )ατ 1 at t = 2. In this case total outstanding debt at the end of the middle period is ατ 1 + τ 0 , and hence larger than the stock of debt at time 0,
In the final period, upon the realization of the shock˜ 2 , the government decides whether to repay or default, s 2 = R, D, in all outstanding debt. We assume that all debt has the same seniority, so once a country defaults, it defaults in all its debt. We also assume that there is no default on interest payments in the middle period. 6 Figure 10 shows a timeline of fiscal revenue shocks and credit market access summarizing the previous discussion.
Lenders and Cost of Default.
The bond market is competitive, with risk-neutral lenders who are willing to subscribe to bonds at any price that, given their beliefs, allows them to break-even. For modeling simplicity we treat the mass of lenders at every period as a single lender.
Lenders have access to a risk-free technology in every period, which pays a risk-less interest rate r f , taken as exogenous and constant across time. There are two separate debt markets, a long-term debt market at t = 0 and a short-term debt market at t = 1.
There is a punishment technology in the model that consists of recovery rates and fiscal confiscation. In the case of default, creditors receive c(1 + r)D, where D is the debt issued (τ 0 or ατ 1 ), and 1 − c represents haircuts. 7 Notice that the haircut is calculated over both, interest and principal.
Moreover, as in any finite-horizon framework, in the absence of other penalties in the final period the borrower would default with probability one. To avoid the trivialities associated with this case, we assume that default in the final period is punished with sanctions that cause the sovereign to lose a fraction η of its current fiscal revenues per unit of face value.
A proportion f (s 1 ) of this fixed cost goes to creditors at time 0, whereas a proportion 1 − f (s 1 ) goes to creditors at time 1. For example, if the sovereign decides to take no action in the middle period, then f (N ) = 1 and 1 − f (N ) = 0, i.e, the total proportion η of fiscal revenues goes to creditors at time 0. On the other hand, if the sovereign decides to issue new debt in the middle period, then only a proportion f (I) = τ 0 τ 0 +ατ 1 of the fiscal recovery goes to creditors at time 0. Hence, given our assumption of no seniority, in this last scenario there is debt dilution in equilibrium. 8
The lender's cash flows are now easy to characterize. Panel (a) of Figure 11 describes the cash flow for a lender at t = 0. In period t = 1 the lender receives interest payments r 0 τ . With probability π the sovereign fully pays and the creditor receives a total revenue of (1 + r f )r 0 τ 0 + (1 + r 0 )τ 0 , which consists of the revenues from investing the interest received in the middle period in the risk-free technology and the interest plus principal.
With probability 1 − π the borrower defaults, and the creditor receives ( Figure 11 shows the cash flows associated to lending at t = 1. With probability π the creditor is paid back interest plus principal,
(1 + r 1 )ατ 1 . With probability 1 − π the creditor faces default, in which case she receives
Notice that not only the interest rates charged by creditors will be endogenous, but also the probability of repayment π and the proportion of fiscal recoveries f (s 1 ).
Sovereign Payoffs
The government is risk neutral, has a discount factor of β and maximizes the present value of future payoffs G = t β t G t . Each period payoff G t is given by
where F t is fiscal revenues, D t is debt issuance, and S t is the debt service in period t. 9 For example the payoff in the middle period in the case the sovereign decides to issue new debt is given by
We are thus assuming that the fiscal cost in the last period is captured by the creditors. As it is clear in Appendices A and B, this assumption simplifies the calculations. In standard models (like in Cohen and Sachs (1985) ) a proportion η goes straight into the waste bin (deadweight losses). However, one can argue in favor of our modeling choice in several ways. For example, about 10% of Greek debt was issued in London. Hence upon default, London courts could in principle get 10% of τ0 back. If τ0 = 2τ2 under a bad shock, then we get η = 0.2 (= 10% of τ0), which as we will see later is our approximated calibration of η. While the recovery record of vulture funds is far from exemplary, it is not a zero return activity either. The November 2012 NYC court ruling on Argentine defaulted debt suggests that such a recovery assumption may not be too off-mark going forward. At any rate, if creditors are able to organize themselves better and extract fiscal surpluses later, this is realistic and all the more so under a common jurisdiction like the EU. In the model the present value of those would then be captured by ητ2. Further, the assumption of trivial deadweight losses may arguably be not so much of a stretch in the broader Eurozone context, as countries with stronger fundamentals indirectly benefit from the debt crisis via lower borrowing costs.
9 Adding curvature would add an extra motive for borrowing. Our qualitative results will not change if we add risk aversion, and would add unnecessary complexity given the task at hand.
The Symmetric Information Benchmark
This section describes the symmetric information benchmark: lenders can perfectly observe the middle period fiscal shock realization.
We model the borrower and lender interaction as a game. The borrower's strategy is defined by a sequence of actions in each period. An action at period 0 of initial debt issuance s 0 = D 0 , an action s 1 after observing the shock realization in period 1, No-Action (s 1 = N ) or Fresh Issuance (s 1 = I), and a repayment action on all outstanding debt in period 2, repayment of default, s 2 = R, D.
The lenders' strategy is given by break-even interest rates in each period, r 0 , r 1 ( 1 ). Notice that period-1 interest rates depend on the fiscal shock realization in period 1, which is perfectly observable.
A Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is a collection of agents' strategies such that each agent's strategy is optimal given everybody else's.
Parametrization
Despite its simple structure, the model presented in Section 3 does not yield a closed form solution. For that reason, in what follows we numerically solve for a SPNE. We save the readers from all the technical details of such calculation. Appendix A presents the complete analytical characterization for equilibrium used in the rest of the section.
In order to numerically solve the model, we need to take a stand on a parametrization, which will be used in the rest of the paper as the baseline case. The model contains twelve parameters: (i) those regarding the initial level of borrowing (τ 0 ) and the sequence of expected fiscal revenues in period 1 and period 2 (τ 1 , τ 2 ); (ii) those regarding fiscal shocks which consist of the probabilities of first and second good shock realizations p and q, the variance of the first and second period shocks (σ(ε 1 ), σ(ε 2 )), and the persistence of the first period fiscal revenue shock (ρ); (iii) those regarding default costs captured by the recovery rate c -i.e., one minus the haircut-and the confiscated share of revenues (η); (iv) those regarding inter-temporal preferences, that is, the discount factor (β) and the risk-free interest rate (r f ). Table 3 shows parameter values for the baseline case.
The initial debt issuance in period 0 is normalized to 100. The mean fiscal revenues in period 1, τ 1 , is set to 100. In many advanced countries -and particularly in the Eurozone, general government revenues are typically in the range of 40% to 50% of GDP, so this parametrization would thus imply an initial (pre-crisis) debt to GDP ratio in that range. This is not far-off the mark: the external debt to GDP ratios for Greece, Portugal, and Spain prior to the crisis (2005) were 55%, 45% and 36% respectively (see Catão and MilesiFerretti, 2014) . We set the second period mean fiscal receipts, τ 2 , to 135. This level is high enough so that a country hit by two negative shocks and defaulting is still able to meet default payments, and low enough so that there is significant default risk. Since our model features only two periods, the second period fiscal revenues could be understood as the present value of future government revenues that can be used to pay off government liabilities, so it should be substantially higher than in the initial period.
The two i.i.d. shocks, ε 1 and ε 2, have the same probability of good realization, p = q = .5, and standard deviation, σ(ε 1 ) = σ(ε 2 ) = 10, .so the shock is entirely symmetric The persistence of the tax revenue shock is ρ = 0.8. As illustrated in Table 3 , these are of a similar order of magnitude of the actual cyclical volatility and persistence of real tax revenues shocks, notably in countries at the epicenter of the recent debt crisis (and even more so if we were to include the 2008-2012 period in the estimation of these parameters).
Following the rationale discussed earlier (see footnote 8), the fiscal confiscation parameter η varies between 0.1 and 0.3. we parameterize c to be between 0.6 and 0.9, consistent with the value range for the haircut (1-recovery rate) between 10% and 40%, as suggested by cross-country evidence (e.g. Cruces and Trebesh, 2013) .
Finally, we set the discount factor β to be 0.96 and the risk-free rate to 1 + r = 1/β + 0.001, implying that international lenders are only infinitesimally less patient than domestic borrowers. This effectively eliminates one of the incentives for borrowing typically found in infinite horizon versions of the canonical model, where the challenge is to engineer debt to GDP ratios in equilibria that are not unrealistically low, sometimes featuring much lower β values. 10
Results
Despite the seemingly simple 2-period structure of the model, there are six possible type of equilibria regarding default outcomes: 11 1. Default never occurs.
2. Default occurs only after two consecutive negative shocks.
3. Default occurs only after a negative second period shock (regardless of the first period shock).
4. Default occurs only after a negative first period shock (regardless of the second period shock).
5. Default occurs after either a first or a second period negative shock.
6. Default always occurs.
Since each of these equilibria outcomes can be, in theory, associated with fresh issuances or lack of thereof in period 1, there are 12 potential equilibria. Figure 12 presents the results when parameters are set at their baseline values and the default parameters are varying within their baseline range (see Table 3 ). Figure 12 , panel (a) reports whether there is an equilibrium with fresh issuance (indexed by 2), no issuance (indexed by 1), or no equilibrium (indexed by 0). 12 For our baseline parametrization we can only find SPNE involving issuance always. Figure 12 , panel (b) reports the type of equilibrium (ranging from type-1 to type-6). Whenever an equilibrium exists, it is either of type-5 (for a narrow range of parameters) or a type-6 (for a large range of parameters).
This means that in a SPNE either default always occurs (type-6) or occurs if the economy experiences a negative shock in either one of the two periods (type-5).
In Figure 12 , panel (c) and panel (d) report the interest rate incurred by a borrower in period 1, following either a good shock (c), or a bad shock (d). Following a good shock, a type-5 economy still enjoys low interest rate since default would only occur following a bad shock in the next period while a type-6 economy exhibits a potentially much higher interest rate as default in the next period is certain. By contrast, following a bad shock, a type-5 now experiences a higher interest rate as such economy now faces certain default exactly as a type-6 equilibrium.
Numerical solutions corresponding to alternative values of the parameters characterizing the shock structure yield very similar results. 13 What varies across alternative parametrizations is only the relative range of default parameters for which a type-5 equilibrium or a type-6 equilibrium arises, but equilibrium is always characterized by fresh issuance regardless of the shock value realization.
The key insight from these results, which will stand in sharp contrast with the asymmetric information results further down, is that in equilibrium, the sovereign issues fresh debt both 12 Note that we are only searching here for equilibrium in pure strategies and we therefore cannot rule out that there are also equilibrium in mixed strategies.
13 Available upon request.
in good and bad times. As a consequence, this model with symmetric information will not be able to produce yield decoupling across countries after a similar bad shock. This will be possible under asymmetric information, as shown in Section 5.3.
Discussion
The basic intuition behind our results is as follows. In our model, a country may find convenient to borrow for two reasons. First, if the sovereign's discount factor β is lower than the investors' discount factor 1/(1 + r f ), then the sovereign would find attractive to borrow in order to front load consumption. Second, since default is possible, taking on more debt increases the value of the default option. 14 In fact, in our baseline parametrization, only the second reason is active (remember that lenders are marginally more impatient than borrowers, see Table 3 ).
To see the benefit from the option value of default, notice that from the definition of the sovereign payoffs we can derive the expected benefit of borrowing at time 1, which is
, where D 0 = τ 0 and D 1 = ατ 1 , R t = 1 + r t , t = 0, 1 and π is the probability of final repayment. It follows that for given R 0 , R 1 and D 0 , the expected marginal benefit of borrowing in the intermediate period is given by
Given that 0 < c < 1, the marginal benefit of an extra unit of borrowing is declining on the probability of repayment π (or increasing in the probability of default).
Of course, borrowing has a cost since R 1 is clearly affected by D 1 . Once extra borrowing takes place and the ratio of debt to revenues D 1 /F 2 goes up, R 1 will go up to the point that investors' break-even condition is satisfied and R 0 will also go up . In this sense, while debt dilution does not affect the sovereign's incentive to default (which is clear from equations 16 and 20 in the Appendix), it does affect the path of equilibrium interest rates, increasing the interest rate charged by senior lenders (R 0 ) as the latter internalize the possibility of a dillution of their claims on the sovereign's final output in case of default. 15
14 Adding curvature to government preferences in the model would exacerbate this effect, rather than overturn it. So, it would not change qualitatively our results. It would change, however, the relative size of equilibrium regions: there would then be a consumption smoothing motive for debt, so a separating equilibrium would be easier to sustain. Another incentive to increase debt in the middle period is the presence of tax Laffer curve effects. When initial debt and tax rates are already sufficiently high that further hikes in rates are revenue-reducing, this can increase the incentive to borrow in t=1 upon a bad shock. For a discussion of tax Laffer curve effects on sovereign risk, see Bi (2012) . 15 The expressions for R0, R1 in the various equilibria are provided in the Appendix (equations 3-13).
In short, the sovereign equilibrium strategy results from the trade-off between the benefit derived from the option of default and the higher interest rate resulting from extra borrowing. As discussed in Section 4.2, under both our baseline parameterization and a wide range of alternative parametrizations, the sovereign's benefits derived from the option to default seem to outweigh the associated interest rate costs; so, in a symmetric equilibrium, issuances at t = 1 occur in both good and bad times.
In the next section we show that these results change dramatically when we add asymmetric information to the model. In this case we can get decoupling even when different countries are subject to similar negative shocks. This is so even if the negative fiscal shock is of the same magnitude in the two countries, and specially if the fiscal shock is more negative in the country where other parameters governing the cost of default are lower.
Asymmetric Information, Fiscal Discoveries and Sovereign

Defaults
We now assume that there is asymmetric information between lenders and the sovereign.
In particular while the borrower can perfectly observe the realization of the middle period fiscal shock˜ 1 , lenders cannot. In the model, the only way lenders can infer some information about the realization of the shock is through the borrower's action in the middle period: No-Action (s 1 = N ) or Fresh Issuance (s 1 = I). Lenders at t = 1, after observing the borrower action will update (when possible) their beliefs of future default and re-price debt accordingly.
As before, we model the borrower and lender interaction as a game. The borrower's strategy is defined by a sequence of actions in each period. An action at period 0 of initial debt issuance s 0 = D 0 , an action s 1 after observing the shock realization in period 1, No-Action (s 1 = N ) or Fresh Issuance (s 1 = I), and a repayment action on all outstanding debt in period 2, repayment of default, s 2 = R, D. The lenders' strategy is given by break-even interest rates in each period, r 0 , r 1 (s 1 ). Notice that period-1 interest rates depend not on the fiscal shock realization in period 1 as in Section 4, but on the sovereign's strategy in period 1. Given the information asymmetry, lenders will update beliefs about the shock realization in period 1 after observing the borrower's action.
A Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is a collection of agents' strategies and beliefs such that each agent's strategy is optimal given everybody else's, and beliefs are consistent with strategies and updated using Bayes' rule (whenever possible).
There are potentially two types of equilibria in pure strategies: Separating and Pooling.
In a separating equilibrium actions following each shock realization will be different, and hence completely revealing, given that the shock takes only two values. 16 On the other hand, in a pooling equilibrium actions following different shock realizations are the same.
In this case, there is no information revelation.
This section provides numerical solutions to the model which illustrate the circumstances in which the sovereign will play a pooling vs. a separating strategy. Unlike in the symmetric information benchmark of Section 4, we show below that under similar parameterizations for the fiscal revenue shock the signaling cost due to asymmetric information may make no-issuance in the middle period optimal for countries with default costs that are high enough. The numerical solutions provided in this section will thus bring into sharp relief what asymmetric information "buys" in our model.
Numerical Solution
We numerically solve for PBE under the same baseline parametrization introduced in Section 4. We save the readers from all the technical details of such calculations. Appendix B presents the complete analytical characterization for separating and pooling equilibria. Figure 13 shows that when default costs are large enough (i.e. the confiscation parameter η is high and haircut is low) the optimal strategy for a country hit by a bad shock is not to issue new debt. This pooling equilibrium prevails for a wide range of parameters as long as a reduction in the recovery rate is compensated by an increase in the fiscal confiscation in order to maintain default costs high enough. Further, this pooling equilibrium is a type-1 equilibrium, i.e.no default occurs for any shock realization in the second period. The reason is that by not issuing, the country hit by a bad shock maintains its debt burden at a low enough level so that defaulting is never optimal. If default costs are smaller, however, incentives to issue following a bad shock are higher and a separating equilibrium emerges. In this separating equilibrium (a type-2 equilibrium), a country hit by a bad shock chooses to re-issue and it may default if it experiences a bad shock realization in the final period. The results show that for a given distribution of shocks, countries with "stronger" fundamentals generally find optimal to play a pooling strategy (of never issuing debt) and those with "weaker" fundamentals find it optimal to play a separating strategy (in which they only issue after a bad shock realization). Figure 14 provides a key illustration on how our model can generate a rather narrow coupling of bond yields followed by a sharp decoupling. This can be seen from the simulated behavior of period-one interest rates as a function of the same parameters. Panel (a) shows the interest rate in the case of a pooling equilibrium. Since this equilibrium is default-free, the interest rate is equal to the risk-free rate (4.27%). Panel (b) shows the interest rate in a separating equilibrium following a good shock. Depending on the severity of the default costs, the interest in a separating equilibrium varies between 4.28% and 4.85%. In good times, the spread between a country playing a pooling and a country playing a separating strategy is therefore at most 0.58%. Notice that this is the case despite the fact that countries face different final default risks. Panel (c) shows the interest rate following a bad shock realization. In this case, the interest rate can be much higher (up to 7%) reflecting the potential of future default costs. The interest rate behavior just described is robust to parameter changes as presented below: after a good shock realization, countries with very different fundamentals face similar rates (so spreads are small); however after a bad shock realization spreads increase.
These results yield two important insights. First, even if countries experienced the same negative fiscal shock realization, different costs of defaulting can produce very different borrowing behavior and yields, and hence distinct default probabilities. In one case (pooling), countries will not issue debt and by doing so will remain riskless. In the other case (separating), they will compensate a bad shock by issuing more debt at a higher interest rate therefore risking default in the second period.
Second, the ranges of parameters for which a pooling equilibrium and a separating equilibrium exist are adjacent. This implies that small differences in default costs can generate large differences in equilibrium outcomes. Therefore, it is plausible in this model that the equilibrium changes from pooling to separating following a modest re-assessment of the default costs, as arguably is in practice.
Discussion
Asymmetric information adds a key cost in the trade-off between issuing vs. not issuing debt in the middle period-namely, the the cost of signaling. As we saw in Section 4 countries find optimal to issue new debt facing a trade off between the benefit derived from the option of default and the cost in rising interest rates. But now, asymmetric information adds an extra channel through which D 1 affects R 1 given that borrowing becomes a signal.
This trade-off between the option value of default versus the signaling cost is what determines whether a separating or pooling equilibrium can be sustained. For some parameter values, the country that receives a bad fiscal shock realization may find profitable to forego the option of borrowing so as to not face higher interest rates. When the benefit of issuing new debt is smaller than it cost, then only a pooling equilibrium can be sustained. Conversely, for some other parameter values, a country that received a bad fiscal shock may be willing to face higher interest rates. In this case, the benefits of issuing new debt far out-weight its costs and a separating equilibrium can be sustained.
In the baseline scenario with symmetric information the sovereign finds optimal to issue fresh debt always. When we add asymmetric information, staying put becomes optimal under favorable fiscal scenarios as well as during bad ones in the pooling equilibrium case.
Fiscal Discoveries and Sudden Yield decoupling
How can this model help rationalize the behavior of spreads shown in Figure 1 , even under similar shock realizations? Answering this question involves a clear distinction between the concept of "country" and "type" in this model. Let country i be defined by
where δ i is a vector of country i's fundamentals (recovery functions, hair-cuts, discount factor, etc) and i is the vector of country i's fiscal shocks.
In our model, for a given country i, i 1 is private information and δ i is common knowledge. Hence, a "type" in our model is defined by the shock realization, i.e., country i could be a high type (when shock realization is high) or a low type (when shock realization is low). 17 Hence, investors in our model can perfectly recognize the difference between different countries fundamentals, but cannot directly observe specifics of fiscal outlooks within each country in real time.
What is key is that the (common knowledge) vector of fundamentals δ i is what determines the magnitude of the main trade-off explained before and hence the type of equilibrium that can be sustained. Consider for the sake of concreteness two countries: country-A, characterized by a set of weak fundamentals, who plays a separating strategy and country-B, characterized by a set of strong fundamentals, who plays a pooling strategy. Suppose countries are hit by a positive fiscal shock. In this case, investors will observe both countries refraining from borrowing and this will generate a very small difference in country spreads.
The gap in country spreads that should prevail due to the gap in country fundamentals is dampened by the presence of informational noise. Though country-B received a good shock, investors do not learn in the pooling game, whereas they do learn in the separating game that country-A was on a good fiscal path. However, the situation is quite different following a negative fiscal shock. In this case, the informational noise works in the same direction as the gap in fundamentals: though investors do not learn from country-B's behavior, they do learn that country-A is on a negative fiscal path and hence spreads wildly diverge. Hence, fiscal discoveries provide a mechanism that can explain both, convergence and sudden yield decoupling.
It is worth re-emphasizing that we are not rationalizing convergence and sudden decoupling by a general cross-country shift from a pooling to a separating equilibrium. Instead, convergence and divergence obtain from the time series implications of pooling and separating equilibria played by different countries. In other words, our model-based interpretation is that yield decoupling takes place because distinct country groups were, at any given point of time (prior and post-2007), finding optimal to play different strategies-some were playing a pooling strategy, whereas others were playing (also all along) a separating strategy. In other words, we rationalize the spread behavior in Figure 1 with a model wherein countries with different fundamentals are on different equilibrium paths all along, but which become discernible only during bad times.
We can see this numerically using our baseline parametrization. We characterize two countries: a "strong-fundamentals" one, country B, (defined as having an expected haircut of only 0.15) vs. a "weak-fundamentals" one, country A, (defined as having a hair-cut twice as large). The two countries have the same value for all the other fundamentals including a common confiscation parameter of 0.25. In particular, they are facing the same shock structure. Under this parametrization, country B is in a pooling equilibrium and country A in an type-2 separating equilibrium (meaning that it will default only if it experiences two negative shocks in a row).
In order to produce time series patterns on borrowing terms and default decisions between time 0 and time T , we consider a repeated version of our two-period credit market game between borrowers and creditors. This approach implicitly assumes that debtors issuing at time t + 2 are not liable for the debt incurred at period t. While not ideal in general, this assumption is innocuous to describe a sequence in which repayment occurs with certainty -because of a series of consecutive good shocks -until the last period where default is possible -because of a bad shock realization. 18 The time series reports the "on the run" interest rate which is either the interest rate on the new issues, or the interest on the outstanding debt issued last period if no new debt has been issued. Figure 15 plots a simulation of the interest rate of the two countries for T = 10: so there are 9 successive positive shocks followed by one negative shock. 19 In this case, during good times (i.e., before the negative shock hits), the bond of country A yields 4.7% return, whereas that of country B yields 4.3%. As in the data, the good times spread between a weak (A) and strong (B) fundamentals country is very narrow despite the fact that the strong fundamental country is default-free while the weak fundamental country faces a 25% chance of default in two periods. 20 After the final bad shock realization, the yield of country A rises to 6.5%. Hence, a significant yield decoupling takes place.
Comparative Statics
In this section we examine the sensitivity of equilibria, and the main trade-off faced by the sovereign, to changes in deep parameters of the model. The parameters we are particularly interested in are: (i) parameters that characterize fiscal shocks-namely, the variance of the first and second period fiscal revenue shock and the persistence of the first period revenue shock; (ii) default costs, as gauged by the "haircut" on debt obligations and the confiscable share of fiscal revenues.
With this goal in mind we consider three scenarios, departing from the baseline scenario considered so far in the paper: (i) a high short-run risk scenario in which the variance of the first period shock varies and is allowed to be much higher than in the final period. In the case of a negative shock, this scenario captures an immediate crisis situation in which the economy is subject to a sharp contraction in the first period while only facing small uncertainty in the second period;
(ii) a high long-run risk scenario in which the variance of the second period shock varies and is allowed to be much higher than the variance of the first period shock. This scenario is meant to describe an economy that is not subject to a major shock in the immediate future but faces large uncertainty in the medium-long run; (iv) a high persistence scenario in which the persistence of the first period shock is higher than in the baseline scenario. 19 We can interpret this sequence of shocks as reflecting the post euro-adoption period followed by the crisis of 2008.
20 The default probability corresponds to the probability of experiencing two successive negative shocks.
Short Run-Risk Scenario
Figures 16 and 17 present evidence on the sensitivity of the type of equilibria and of the attendant yields to changes in short-run uncertainty and haircuts. Relative to the baseline parametrization (which sets σ(ε 1 ) = 10), now the short-run volatility can be up to three times as large since σ(ε 1 ) ∈ [0, 30]. Confiscation after default is fixed at η = 0.25 throughout these figures (see Table 2 ). Figure 16 shows that pooling is harder to sustain when short-run volatility increases. At the baseline level, for a short-run volatility equal to 10, pooling can be sustained for any haircut lower than 0.28. When short-run volatility is 20, the range of pooling is much smaller, with pooling sustainable only for haircut lower than 0.2. The flip side is that the range of parameters over which a separating equilibrium obtains is now larger. The intuition is simple. Given substantial persistence (ρ = 0.8), higher short-run volatility (relative to second period volatility) implies that a large part of the uncertainty can be resolved after the first period shock, strongly conditioning the default vs. repayment outcome in the second period. Consider a country with a haircut equal to 0.25: when short-run volatility is set at the baseline level, the country is in a pooling equilibrium. However as soon as short-run volatility increases beyond 12, a separating equilibrium emerges with associated default risk in the second period. Moreover, as shown in panel (c), a new type of separating equilibrium (type-4) arises, implying that the first period shock is a perfect predictor of second period default. Countries hit by a bad shock face little prospect of recovery and default in the second period. Countries experiencing a positive shock remain solvent in the second period. 21 As a consequence the bond yield is higher than in the baseline case, ranging from 500 to 950 bps (see Figure 17 panel (c)). As seen in Section 2, this range is in line with recent debt crisis experience.
To sum up, the higher the short-run volatility the easier it is to sustain a separating equilibrium, given that the default option becomes more attractive. Once again, here "the Tarpeian Rock is not far from the Capitol" as the range of default costs for which following a bad shock, the country remains either riskless (pooling equilibrium of type 1) or defaulting for sure (separating equilibrium of type 4) are adjacent.
Long Run-Risk Scenario
Figures 18 and 19 present evidence on the sensitivity of the type of equilibria and of the attendant yields to changes in long-run volatility and haircuts. Relative to the baseline parametrization (which sets σ(ε 2 ) = 10), now the long-run volatility can be up to three times as large since σ(ε 2 ) ∈ [0, 30]. Confiscation after default is fixed at η = 0.25 throughout these figures (see Table 3 ).
As shown in Figure 18 panel (a), pooling dominates, specially when default costs (lower hair-cut) are high enough. Note that despite the high variance of the final period shock, the economy remains risk less (type-1 equilibrium), as shown in Figure 18 panel (b) . Anticipating that borrowers will not find optimal to issue new debt following a bad shock, creditors do not face any dilution risk. However, as long-run volatility increases, the possibility of remaining default-free in all circumstances is somewhat reduced, implying that the combination of parameters for which pooling is an equilibrium shrinks slightly. As shown in Figure 18 , a separating equilibrium is harder to sustain compared to the baseline scenario: when the long-run volatility increases, the region of parameters for which a separating equilibrium exists tends to shrink. And when long-run volatility is high enough, there is no separating equilibrium.
Interestingly, the timing of volatility matters greatly for the type of separating equilibrium.
In the case of short-run volatility, an increase in short-run volatility shifts the type of separating equilibrium from type 2 (default occurs only in the eventuality of two subsequent negative shocks) to type 4 (defaults occurs for sure in the final period if a bad shock occurs in the interim period). The exact opposite occurs with long-run volatility. The reason for this contrast is due to the fact that under high short-run volatility, default risk is highly determined by the first period shock with little chance of avoiding default after a negative interim period shock. Under high long run volatility, uncertainty about the future means more chances to escape default.
The combination of a low debt level and a low interest rate (see Figure 19 panel (a)) makes it optimal for debtors to choose not to default even in the situation where they suffer two bad fiscal shock realizations in a row. In the tiny region where equilibrium is separating, the interest rate can be much higher than the risk free rate (see Figure 19 panel (c)).
In short, the higher the long-run volatility the harder it is to sustain a separating equilibrium. The reason for this is simple. When the second period shock is larger than in the baseline, there is a lot of future uncertainty on the ability to service debt and hence cost of issuance rises.
Varying Persistence
Figures 20 and 21 present evidence on the sensitivity of the type of equilibria and of the attendant yields to changes in persistence and haircuts. Relative to the baseline parametriza-tion (which sets ρ = .8), now we let persistence to vary from 0.5 to 1. Confiscation after default is fixed at η = 0.25 throughout these figures (see Table 2 ).
As shown in Figure 20 panel (a), the parameter range for pooling (separating) is somewhat smaller (larger) than in the baseline scenario. When equilibrium is pooling default never occurs ( Figure 20 panel (b) ) and hence the interest rate is very insensitive to persistence ( Figure 21 panel (a) ). As shown in Figure 20 panel (c), as persistence increases, two types of separating equilibria exist: a type-2 equilibrium when persistence is low enough, and a type-4 equilibrium when persistence is very high, and so default will happen for sure after a bad shock in t=1. When the equilibrium changes from type-2 to type-4, the interest rate increases sharply as the economy evolves from a situation in which default next period will occur only in case of a repeated bad shock to a situation in which default is unavoidable and the bond yield rate sky rockets ( Figure 21 panel (d)).
To sum up, the higher the persistence, the easier it is to sustain a separating equilibrium.
The intuition is again simple: higher persistence improves the informational value of countries' middle period signal regarding default risk in the second period. This means that when fundamentals are not strong enough to ensure pooling, default risk and hence bond yields are extremely sensitive to shock persistence. Finally, note that there is an important difference between higher short-run volatility and higher persistence. As shown in Figure   16 and Figure 20 , a separating equilibrium that exists with low short run volatility could disappear when short run volatility is high enough. This is not the case with persistence.
As Figure 20 shows, a separating equilibrium that exists with low persistence, will continue to exist with higher persistence.
Fiscal Shock Parameters and Yield Decoupling
We go back to our dynamic exercise of yield decoupling of Section 5.3 and see how changes in fiscal shock parameters can amplify the decoupling. Keeping the parameterization of default costs at the same level as in Section 5.3 (c = 0.3 for A and c = 0.15 for B), Figure   22 shows what happens if the weaker country A faces higher volatility (both short and long term) as well as higher persistence.
When short-run volatility increases from 10% to 15%, the interest rate in good times increases very modestly, by 10 bps, but the interest rate following a bad shock increases sharply form 6.5% to 9.1%.
Halving long-run volatility from 10% to 5% reduces slightly the good times interest rate (by 5 bps) but actually it increases the interest rate following a bad shock (from 6.46% to 6.87%) reflecting the lower probability to offset the consequence of a negative shock in the interim period by a good shock in the final one.
Finally raising persistence from the baseline level of 0.8 to 0.9 also implies a rise in interest rate following a bad shock but more modest (to 7.2%).
These results indicate that, conditional on some countries playing a separating equilibrium strategy, and others a pooling equilibrium strategy, the extent of yield decoupling following a negative shock can vary substantially depending on the size of the shock and its persistence. This is broadly consistent with the evidence discussed in Section 2, where it is shown that the the volatility and persistence of tax revenue shocks display significant cross-country differences.
Conclusion
The results of our model show that introducing asymmetry of information about the realization of a fiscal shock in an otherwise standard model of sovereign default can explain key features of the recent debt crisis in the eurozone, namely: (i) yield convergence during the boom phase; (ii) sudden decoupling of yields following a large negative common shock; and (iii) yield decouplings that are concomitant with large observable differences in borrowing patterns across countries.
Through the lens of our model, sovereign yield dispersion across the Eurozone can be rationalized by the co-existence of two country groups on distinct equilibrium paths all along: for one group, fundamentals are strong enough for a pooling strategy to be optimal;
but not for all others. As the two groups were subject to smaller and mostly positive shocks between 1999 and 2007, yields converged except for residual gaps due to differences in common-knowledge fundamentals. But when the large negative common shock of 2008-09 hit and tax revenues dropped sharply, it was still optimal for the first group to adjust spending and refrain from borrowing, thus signaling a brighter fiscal outlook; in contrast, for those on a separating equilibrium it was optimal to resort to extensive borrowing.
Higher debt ratios and expected deterioration of the fiscal outlook in the latter group translate into higher country risk.
The key theoretical difference between the symmetric and asymmetric version of our model is the existence of a signaling motive to refrain from borrowing in the latter case. In absence of such a signaling motive, countries have incentives to borrow in order to fully exploit the default option; so the decoupling that reflects differences in borrowing patterns simply does not occur.
Two key fundamentals that distinguish country groups in the model are the underlying volatility and persistence of fiscal revenue shocks. They give rise to distinct valuations for the option of extra borrowing: more volatile countries tend to benefit more from the option of borrowing to either default or gamble for resurrection. These differences in the underlying stochastics of revenue shocks have been non-trivial across the Eurozone. But differences in other parameters defining relative default costs also appear to have been non-trivial. We have explored them too in our model simulations to show that sharp yield decoupling can occur even under the same negative fiscal shock across countries: those with strong loan-recovery parameters will tend to be on a pooling equilibrium and adjust fiscally refraining extensive issuance during bad times, whereas the weaker-fundamental countries will tend to play a separating strategy and borrow to explore the option of debt write-offs.
Three other results of our model's simulations deserve attention. First, the model posits that high short-term uncertainty regarding fiscal revenues increases the dominance of separating equilibrium. Conversely, higher long-run uncertainty increases pooling. Second, there are sizable regions of continuity between the two equilibria around some (empirically) relevant parameter ranges; so some equilibria can be quite fragile. This can have far-reaching implications if (and when) parameter uncertainty is substantial; so, while parameter uncertainty does not explicitly feature in our setting, these results are suggestive that it is a potentially interesting avenue for future extensions. Third, we never obtain equilibrium regions where default occurs when equilibrium is pooling. If, instead, the equilibrium is separating, default may or may not ultimately materialize depending on the size and sequencing of shocks as well as the relative cost of default.
Some implications for policy analysis are apparent. If the ultimate policy objective in a currency union is to mitigate sudden and sharp yield decoupling during bad shocks, our results suggest that policy should try to ensure that countries play the same equilibrium strategy all along. This can be achieved by making fundamentals more similar across countries -notably in our model, by reducing long-standing differences in the volatility and the persistence of fiscal revenues as well as in parameters that govern the relative cost of default (like trade openness, investors' "confiscation technology", and subjective discount rates).
Short of that similarity, one would then need union-wide fiscal arrangements that transfer resources to high-volatility/low default cost countries during bad times (and mutatis mutandis during good times to ensure fiscal neutrality over the cycle). This would help mitigate the signaling effect of excessive tapping from private capital markets during bad shocks that can trigger the perverse fiscal dynamics highlighted above. 22 In the absence 22 As discussed in Reis (2013) , central bank policies may also have a role to play in this connection, specially if such fiscal risk sharing arrangements are missing and national fiscal policies are not sufficiently credible.
of these two conditions, our results also offer insight on what the much touted emphasis on fiscal transparency and timely release of fiscal information may paradoxically achieve -namely, reducing the incentives of some countries to refrain from borrowing in order to signal the strength of their fiscal position. This paradoxical result further corroborates the general point that introducing asymmetric information on fiscal shocks in a standard model of sovereign debt may change some of its qualitative predictions in non-trivial ways that warrant attention. Note: Last two rows report the medians of the respective country groups, where Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are the crisis countries. The persistence of fiscal revenues is calculated as the AR(1) coefficient of a regression of the HP-detrended log of CPI-deflated revenues on its lag. Note: In Table 1 an Table 2 , the last two rows report the medians of the respective country groups, where Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are the crisis countries. The persistence of fiscal revenues is calculated as the AR(1) coefficient of a regression of the HP-detrended log of CPI-deflated revenues on its lag. 
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